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THE NOBEL PRIZE FOR LAW
Alfred F. Conard*
There is no Nobel prize for law. This lack is not in itself a
cause for concern, since the discipline of law is replete with its
own rewards. But some cause for concern inheres in the implication that law provides very few examples of the kinds of contributions to humanity that merit Nobel prizes.
I.

Wttv No NOBEL?

Nobel prizes are awarded to recognize extraordinary contributions to human welfare or human understanding. Very little that
is done in the name of law would qualify, and the little that
might qualify is hard to recognize.
Contributions that might qualify are hard to recognize because legal ideas are hard to evaluate before they are put into
effect. By the time that a creative idea is put into effect, it has
been reshaped by many minds or hands, and appropriated by
even more numerous public figures. The genius of the original
Bardeen 1 or Crick2 is obscured by the overlay of revisions by
others.
A more fundamental obstacle to awarding a Nobel prize for
law is the difference between what scientists and artists do for
humanity and what lawyers do. When a scientist discovers a
means of making rice fields more productive, he adds to the food
supply without taking food from anyone. When a poet provides
us with a new insight, he makes us wiser without making anyone
more ignorant.
Law, on the other hand, is largely concerned with taking from
one person in order to give to another. In this respect it does not
differ from government or commerce, the former of which ad• Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1932, Grinnell
College; LL.B. 1936, University of Pennsylvania; J.S.D. 1942, Columbia University;
LL.D. 1971, Grinnell College.
1. John Bardeen received the Nobel Prize in physics in 1956 for the discovery of the
transistor effect and in 1972 for development of a theory of superconductivity.
2. Francis Crick received the Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine in 1962 for the
discovery of the molecular structure of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid).
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ministers involuntary exchanges while the latter consists of voluntary ones. Law, government, and commerce are all essential to
society, but the positive balance of benefits over costs of some of
their applications is minuscule or doubtful.
The uncertainty of net benefit in some of the applications of
law is particularly conspicuous in the law of torts. According to
the fantasies of legal theory, tort-feasors are compelled to pay
damages to tort victims, so that tort victims become richer than
they were before the transfer, and tort-feasors correspondingly
poorer. The arithmetic sum is zero, but the money transferred is
assumed to do more good in the hands of the victim than in the
hands of the tort-feasor. If the facts corresponded to the fantasy,
one would have no reason to question the positive balance of
benefit over cost.
But the idea that tort law transfers money from tort-feasors to
tort victims is far from reality. Most of the money received by
tort victims comes not from tort-feasors but from the general
public through insurance premiums, and the public pays out
more than two dollars for every one dollar that gets to a tort
victim. When the victim who receives the payment is severely
impoverished, one dollar in his hands is probably more beneficial than two in the hands of premium payers, but the opposite
is likely to be true when the victim's needs are no more acute
than those of the average payer of premiums.
If tort law's expensive transfers have a saving grace, it is their
deterrent function. If the threat of liability induces a surgeon,
for example, to use a little more care in counting sponges, it
spares patients from enormous suffering and expense at very little cost to anyone. There must be some such cases, although it is
far from certain that threats of retribution reduce the incidence
of unintended errors. Instead of extirpating error, the threat of
liability is likely to induce expenditures, up to the level of the
probable damages, on additional personnel and sophisticated instruments. Procedures become safer, but consume a larger share
of available resources. Whether the net effect on aggregate
health is positive or negative remains conjectural. Whatever the
balance may be, it is not in a class with the balance that results
from discovering a more nourishing strain of food grains.
Because of these inherent characteristics of tort law, the great
forward leaps in it that enthuse lawyers do not have the same
appeal to the rest of humanity. Dramatic increases in the sums
of money that are awarded for mental pain and suffering or for
asbestos poisoning are presumably beneficial to the recipients,
but most of the money comes from the pockets of investors and
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consumers. In the rare case in which liability costs are not
passed on to investors and consumers, a substantial fraction of
them falls on taxpayers, since the companies that are held liable
deduct their payments or ins.urance premiums from their taxable income.
If we turn our eyes from torts to the criminal law, large net
gains for humanity are equally elusive. The most conspicuous
activity of "justice" in this area is putting people into prison.
The beneficial aspects of this activity consist partly of disabling
the offenders (while they are in jail) from committing crimes
against people who are out of jail, and partly of deterring them
and their likes from committing future crimes. The direct costs
are not only the deprivation of convicts' liberty and their dependents' support, but also the price of providing board and room
to the convicts while they are imprisoned. Incalculable indirect
costs inhere in the contagion of criminality that is propagated
among convicts and their families by the prison experience. But
nonimprisonment and early release seem to offer countervailing
dangers for the potential victims of crime. The triumphs of lawyers-whether in putting suspects into prison or in keeping
them out-often seem like hollow victories for the rest of the
population.
Incremental gains are of course possible. Civil and criminal
law are susceptible of improvement within their basic
frameworks. Changes can be made that increase benefits a little
more than they increase costs, although available methods of.
measurement will render the gains disputable. But hardly any of
the improvements that are imagined and advocated by jurists
can be compared in their cost-benefit ratio with a scientific discovery or a work of art.

II.

POTENTIAL WINNERS

Are great gains with minor costs possible in the area of law
and justice? Nobel prizes reward two very different kinds of
gains. One kind is exemplified by the peace prize awarded in
1978 to Sadat and Begin, and in 1973 to Kissinger and Le Due
Tho. The prize was for stopping a conflict, with great benefit to
everyone involved, and negligible losses to anyone.
The other kind of Nobel prize is awarded for an addition to
knowledge or insight, in science or in art. It is awarded for
achievements such as discovering the double helix, or writing the
Gulag Archipelago.
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Either kind of prize might be merited in the area of law and
justice. I will discuss a few possibilities.
A.

Reducing Conff,ict

Society confronts a number of expensive conflicts, other than
war, which might be susceptible of resolution by less expensive
means. At the end of the nineteenth century, disputes between
employees and employers were commonly waged exclusively by
deprivation and violence. As a result of labor legislation and
other developments, weapons of deprivation and violence have
been partially replaced by peaceful bargaining. If resort to deprivation and violence has actually decreased, the resulting amelioration of the costs of struggle may have deserved a Nobel prize.
A more basic treatment of conflicts between employers and
employees . may be seen in the European institution of
codetermination. This is not merely a change of weapons, as in
collective bargaining under the United States Labor-Management Relations Act, but the opening of an avenue for agreement
on common objectives. Another promising institution, which is
gaining ground in the United States and might lead eventually
to a coalescence of employer and employee objectives, is employee stock ownership. All of these developments are imaginable Nobel candidates.
Another example of a big gain for humanity with little cost
may be the program of "release on own recognizance," which
was launched by the VERA project in New York. Thousands of
suspects were saved from imprisonment and from the loss of opportunity to earn income pending trial, while the state was
spared the expense of housing them in prison. One cannot be
certain of the net gain without knowing how many crimes the
released ·suspects committed between arraignment and trial, but
the general appraisal of the program has been favorable.
A great leap forward in justice may have been achieved in
New Zealand by abolishing tort claims for personal injury. Medical costs and wage losses are reimbursed largely by public funds,
without the expenses of insurance administration and fault
determination.

B. Expanding Knowledge
Major advances in law have occasionally come about through
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flashes of insight followed by fortuitous waves of public acceptance, but similar advances are unlikely to occur frequently until
there is more knowledge, and more recognition of knowledge,
about how legal processes work. Thinking about law is constricted by underlying beliefs that are often little better than superstitions. In the area of crime, each of us "knows" in his or her
own mind that crime would be immensely reduced by increasing
welfare payments, or by increasing incarceration, or by sanitizing television, or by revitalizing religion, but there is no consensus among us, and no scientific basis for a consensus. In the
area of torts, laymen, lawyers, judges, and professors talk as if
malpractice damages were paid by negligent physicians, without
knowing whether physicians sustain significant diminutions of
their incomes, or manage to shift their liabilities to patients, to
employers (via health insurance), or to taxpayers (via Medicare
and Medicaid). In the area of mental injury, theorists advocate
recovery of damages for invading privacy or for precipitating
pain wifoout knowing whether such damage suits increase or decrease privacy or pain.
Knowledge about the workings of legal processes is not gained
by debating the meaning of statutes and constitutions, or even
by examining their history, although these exercises are useful
guides to society's evaluation of objectives. Statistics are not
necessarily any more helpful. Decreases in the number of reported crimes do not necessarily indicate decreases in committed crimes; neither do decreases in the number of civil rights
complaints indicate decreases in the number of civil rights
violations.
Fortunately, more relevant knowledge is being accumulated.
Empirical studies are disclosing the effects, or absence of effects,
of exclusionary rules on the behavior of police officers and prosecutors. A few surveys, instead of collating police records, have
asked ordinary citizens how often they experience assaults, burglaries, arrests, and searches. In the area of malpractice, physicians and hospitals have responded to queries about how malpractice liability affects their practices and their financial
charges. The correlations of automobile accidents with enforcement of drinking-driver laws have been observed in various
countries. Studies of these kinds bring us closer to discovering
principles that can be used in framing laws whose net benefits
are more certain.
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PROPAGATING WINNERS

Scientific knowledge about the effects of laws on human behavior is not plentiful. It seldom appears in traditional law reviews, and is encountered more frequently in journals devoted to
socio-legal research, like the Law and Society Review, the American Bar Foundation Research Journal, and the Journal of Legal Studies. It is not generated principally in law schools, but in
departments of sociology and economics. This provenance probably results from two differences between the study of law and
the study of social sciences. Law professors tend to think about
what should be penalized and what rewarded, and to derive
their information on the subject from constitutions, statutes,
and judicial decisions. Social scientists tend to think about
causes and effects in human behavior, and are trained in collecting data and deriving correlations between what people do and
the influences bearing upon them. This way of thinking about
the legal system is likely to precede creative developments in it.
The optimal organization of the pursuit of scientific knowledge about the legal system remains to be discovered. I will venture here a few tentative thoughts about it. The current concentration of empirical observation in departments of social science
has the advantage of associating the investigators with colleagues who are oriented toward scientific methods of thought
and analysis. It has the disadvantages of dispersing the investigators among different departments and of separating them
from law teachers. Law teachers have, notwithstanding their
doctrinal orientation, a considerable acquaintance with the realities of the legal system, which could illuminate the investigations made by social scientists. Besides, law teachers and law
schools would be enriched by closer contacts with scientific investigations of the system whose doctrines they expound. If scientific study of the legal system continues to develop principally
outside of law schools, law schools will become more and more
separated from the frontiers of knowledge about their own field
of learning.
Law faculties differ as to whether they want the scientific
study of legal processes to be carried on in close association with
the study of positive law or whether they want to let it develop
in other settings. Those who favor a close association confront a
puzzle about how to achieve it.
One approach consists of substituting social science courses
for law courses in the standard curriculum. This suggestion re-
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ceives aid and comfort from reductionists who believe that law
students learn in their first year all the law that matters. Advocates of this solution underestimate, in my view, the difference
between what a lawyer needs to know in order to play the games
of which the practice largely consists and what a lawyer needs to
know in order to reform the legal system. The difference is
something like that between what a military officer needs to
know in order to win battles and what a diplomat needs to know
in order to negotiate treaties. Peace may be promoted by educating peace makers, but it is unlikely to be advanced by abandoning the education of soldiers. The wasteful ways of the legal
system will not be reduced by suspending formal education in
the gambits by which the existing games are played.
The study of how the legal system operates is very different
from the study of what the legal rules are. Although the two
should be on speaking terms, they are not interchangeable. The
scientific study of the legal system calls for a program that is
distinguishable from that of practitioner training, and bears a
name of its own. It might be described as the "laws of law,"
meaning the scientific laws (like the laws of chemistry, physics
and physiology) that govern the operation of society's laws (like
civil and criminal codes). If it were to be christened in the academic tradition of Greek and Latin roots, it might be called
nomonomics, nomology, jurology or juridics. For the nonce, I will
call it juridical science.
Curricula in juridical science will start out on a modest scale
because, among other reasons, there is no established demand
for doctors of juridical science. Initially, these curricula may
consist of traditional law courses mingled with experience in research on projects sponsored by grants from foundations or government agencies. A few brave candidates will choose to study in
these curricula, as they have done in other nascent scientific endeavors, even though their opportunities for future employment
are obscure. Some of the graduates will be hired as assistants to
legislators and government executives. Law firms whose practice
involves legislative and administrative advocacy-like those that
make up Washington's "other government"-may seed their
practitioner staffs with juridical scientists. A few of the juridical
science courses will probably be useful to future practitioners,
especially those that illuminate the evaluation of scientific and
pseudoscientific evidence.
Although the curriculum in juridical science will not prepare a
student very well for the private practice of law, I see no need
for giving its graduates a different degree. "Juris doctor" seems
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to befit a juridical scientist at least as well as it befits a practitioner. Juridical science may be regarded as a department of the
law school that leads to the same degree with a different "major," alongside a major in legal practice or various majors in areas of practice, such as private law and public law. As in other
departmentalized schools, diplomas and transcripts could disclose the area of the graduate's concentration, so that bar examiners and employers could draw such distinctions as they wish
among graduates of different curricula.
Other and better arrangements for the propagation of juridical
science can probably be imagined. The hospitality of its environment will affect the rate of its maturation, but the science will
survive and multiply in some form. Juridical scientists may win
no Nobel prizes, but some juridical scientists will deserve them.

